On Statecraft, Morale, and the Hyphasis Mutiny of 326 BCE

   The world we live in – it is one that is permeated by innumerable inquiries, veracities, axioms, and aphorisms for which we strive to understand and internalize the nature of our everyday lives. In few realms, however, is this dynamic more tangibly understood and elucidated than in the analysis and contemplation of our history. For when one reflects upon the annals of history, and the storied lineage of our collective civilization, a myriad of axioms and revelations can come to light, all of which are only further amplified when we try to internalize these events as living history, or – to quote the Renaissance-Era Philosopher Machiavelli – “to adorn oneself with ancient garbs . . . to enter the ancient courts of ancient men . . . to be received by them lovingly . . .”. Therefore, it is especially rare, yet one of the most intrinsically fascinating discoveries in any aspiring historian’s life, to elucidate the climactic culminations’ of years, decades, and even centuries of buildup and tension all in one, quintessential moment. Yet, there are very few moments that can better epitomize this zenith of the centuries more effectively, and in a more captivating fashion than the life of Alexander the Great. For Alexander’s exploits were, in itself the culmination and fruition of centuries of conflict, development, progression, and intrigue within the Greek World, pioneered by countless statesmen, generals, orators, philosophers, and leaders – most notably his own father Philip. Furthermore, this culmination was not limited to the realm of the Hellenes, but also in the culmination of centuries of Greco-Persian conflict, decades of Persian decline, and the growing unrest and disillusion amongst native populations subject to a previously stable, lassez-faire Persian rule – which had in later years been plagued by decadence, corruption, revolts, and internal strife.

   Therefore, through this perspective, it is highly fascinating to understand the archetypal rise, and dramatic fall of Alexander as the exploitation of centuries of preceding circumstances by a brilliant father and son, alongside the often-godlike admiration of Alexander as this larger-than-life archetype. Moreover, from a philosophical, and psychological perspective, Alexander was not only the culmination of but the very epitomization of countless Greek psychological concepts and, in another way, the Greek collective psyche at the time; with all of its talents and flaws (yet this is a subject better reserved for another time). However, within Alexander’s own life, there was a fundamental zenith of the ages, which was a culmination of his own exploits and actions, in the same manner, which he himself was the culmination of centuries of prior intrigue in both the Greek and Persian worlds – for this event I speak of was the Mutiny at Hyphasis. The year was 326 BCE, and Alexander’s army had long ago crossed the Hellespont, the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, and even the Indus River – yet now, nearly a decade after his conquest commenced, with the initial intention of liberating the Greek Cities on the Ionian Coast from Persian rule, he and his army had conquered the entire Persian empire, and now, after establishing the largest Empire the world had ever seen up until that point, they were marching deep into the Indian subcontinent, with the new intention of conquering the entire known world.

    Alexander’s soldiers had been growing skeptical and weary for years over a plentitude of grievances and concerns, none of which Alexander served to alleviate or assuage, and following an increasingly questionable battle record as the army grew weary, pushing further and further Eastwards in what many feared would become an endless war, and following several previously unsuccessful mutinies, at Hyphasis in modern-day Punjab, Alexander’s Army refused to march any further after tens of thousands of miles. Shortly thereafter, following a brief but impassioned attempt to rally the troops around the prospect of further conquest, Alexander submitted to the will of the masses, and like that, the exploits of antiquities’ greatest conqueror had seemingly come to an end, as a couple years later Alexander died in Babylon at the age of 32 under questionable circumstances. Now, like nearly all of history’s great events, the mutiny at Hyphasis has been attributed to a myriad of grievances amongst the troops as the primary cause of this mutiny; some assert that it was primarily due to a feeling of homesickness, others, due to popular disillusion and a lack of faith in Alexander, however, today it shall be our objective to argue that these feelings of resent and disillusion that were objectively manifest at Hyphasis were primarily due to a belief that Alexander and the Macedonian Army had already long ago accomplished the goals that they initially set out to achieve – utilizing both primary and secondary evidence to reinforce our claim and to further elucidate our knowledge therein.

    Now, first and foremost, before we dive into the circumstances surrounding the mutiny at Hyphasis, it is important to first assert the objective historical veracity that (as recorded by many personal journals, primary and secondary historians, and even the Official Court Historian of Alexander Callisthenes) that the goal of the Macedonian Army at least in Alexander’s mind and expressions had drastically evolved over the course of his campaign. Initially, as expressed not only in Alexander’s statements and declarations, but in the official declarations of his father to the League of Corinth, the ‘Persian Campaign’, or ‘Asian Campaign’, was carried out with the intention of the; ‘Liberation of the Greek Cities on the Ionian Coast, and the avenging of the desecration of the Parthenon and various other Temples in 480 BCE’. Yet this conquest had by all accounts transformed into the conquest of the entire Persian Empire in the name of (predominantly) the liberation of Greeks and other subjugated peoples’, under the newly liberated care of the Greeks; before eventually metamorphosizing into a fusion of attempts to recreate the mythical, to conquer the known world, and (at least purportedly in Alexander’s mind) to accomplish a sort of living deification through such a Sisyphean task that it would dwarf the legends of Hercules and Dionysus (or simply put, antiquities’ greatest one-man Ego Roller Coaster).

   The question we arrive upon however is if this metamorphosis was the primary or at the very least a considerable cause of the mutiny at Hyphasis – however within the aforementioned speech of Alexander at Hyphasis, not only does he acknowledge this claim and source of grievance, but he validates this point of view, and from both a rhetorical and a logistical point, does he attempt to address it. Within his speech, he not only acknowledges this metamorphosis of their aim, but that it has grown to something greater, and he has led the Armies of Macedon to the precipice of great riches and prosperity that, for those who continue, he states; “Those who remain shall be the envy of those who leave us behind”. Furthermore, regarding the latter attempt to appeal to his army, Alexander states that as conquest continues, two new goals have arose, the first to; “civilize and stabilize the further Asian provinces, which cannot be resolved through retreat”, and the second to integrate the two populations of European and Asian in a singular kingdom and identity (a surprisingly admirable, progressive concept coming from Alexander in his time period and state of mind), which (as shall be addressed in greater depth shortly), had emerged as an increasingly predominant dream of Alexander’s. Therefore we can internalize the widespread belief and the almost open secret at that point, that what the army initially set out to do had been accomplished long before Hyphasis, and that this was admittedly a source of open disillusion.

   Beyond Alexander himself, Callisthenes, Ptolemy, and a few other firsthand accounts; there are few sources from the Ancient World that more effectively and accurately encapsulate the life, times, and circumstances of Alexander’s exploits better than Diodorus Siculus, who notably addressed the widespread discussion on the metamorphosis of the goal from an already achieved mission to a Sisyphean task for the purposes of legitimizing a continuation of conquest extensively, and particularly in his accounting of the conflicts immediately before, and the mutiny at Hyphasis. For within Book XVII of his histories, he acknowledges the increasingly difficult level’s of conflict that Alexander’s army was facing in the Indian Subcontinent (which also presents a potential counter-argument surrounding skepticism in Alexander’s leadership on a tactical level), yet acknowledges in the discussion of soldiers (including the discussion between Alexander and Hephaestion on the subject, and a consistent allusion to a “devolution of purpose in the army”), for, as he emphasized previously, the army of Alexander had been so aroused in the first place due to an ancestral gripe and sense of vengeance against the Persians that they felt had long-ago withered away by the time they were in India.

   Following the Battle of Hydaspes in 326 BCE between Alexander the Great and King Porus in Northern India, the two had ultimately reconciled as Alexander reinstated Porus as a satrap under him (in old Persian fashion), and had amidst growing discontent held a dialogue with Porus which has been recorded in numerous sources, including the above source, and that of Arrian. Within this dialogue, which occurred not long before the Hyphasis Mutiny, Alexander informs Porus of his metamorphosized, readjusted plan of World conquest, to which Porus informs him of the vast, untamed kingdoms and civilizations of the Indian subcontinent and beyond. In response, Alexander informed Porus of his dismay, and of the increasing skepticism amongst his soldiers and advisors (particularly Perdicass), regarding this change in goals – a further acknowledgment that would serve as evidence that this metamorphosizing goal only served to eradicate Alexander’s Legitimacy in the eyes of his soldiers, and following the increasing gap between the mind of Alexander and the mind of the masses, the ignition of the powder keg that was the Mutiny at Hyphasis.

  Now, throughout centuries of compilation of scholastic research, we can tangibly observe the cultural context of Alexander’s speeches at Hyphasis, Opis, and more, yet especially these later liturgies’ surrounding the growing discontent and frustration of Alexanders Army, and the cultural context addressed of a devolving goal that was Alexander’s objective, transforming from a tangible, historically-based goal of liberation of cities to a legendary, unattainable task of outcompeting the gods themselves, and conquering the entire world. Here, Nagle, a former scholar from USC, acknowledges the prevalence of this sentiment held amongst members of Alexander’s court, and the ability to analyze it in their writing, whether it be Callisthenes or Ptolemy (who we shall observe in greater detail shortly thereafter), which addressed this goal alongside the goal of cultural synthesis, which delivers us to another issue in the form of gripes over Alexander’s increasingly fusionist cultural identity.

    Moreover, we can observe and internalize analytical evidence and confirmation of the origin of the Hyphasis Mutiny due to an evolving, increasingly egotistical goal of Alexander that had grown separated from the aspirations of his Army through the writing of the Roman Historian Plutarch, in his Lives’ Life of Alexander; in which, akin to all of his other Parallel Lives, he addresses the life of Alexander while comparing it to another similarly flawed historical figure (in this case Julius Caesar), incorporating a uniquely moralistic outlook upon the lives of historical figures. In the case of Alexander, this incorporated an exposition into his own ego (akin to that of Caesar), and developing megalomania throughout his conquests, which culminated in the evolution of his goal and intentions in conquest, that would ultimately cause the emergence of a Sisyphean war, and the Hyphasis mutiny. Thereby, we can observe Plutarch’s acknowledgment of this ego-driven modification of the goal, which the army had already believed to be achieved, and utilized it to mutiny at Hyphasis and ultimately end the campaign. Now, Plutarch’s Lives definitely presents the strongest argument for this understanding, however (as much as I love Plutarch), I must admit that it ought to be taken with a grain of salt, due to the intensely moralistic focus in all of Plutarch’s biographies as was fashionable at the time in Roman literature.

     With regards to contradictory evidence and Counterarguments pertaining to the mutiny at the Hyphasis and the later revolts of Alexander’s troops, few sources can carry a greater, more seismic weight than that of Arrian, who wrote of the various revolts against Alexander largely having to do with the rising ‘Orientalism of the Court’ of Alexander, in replacing Greek customs with Asian ones, and the traditionally Hellenistic style of governance with a more Persian-esque, old monarchical style, alongside various other characteristics. This sentiment, although having reached a climacteric boiling point at Opis, had according to Arrian been prevalent at the Hyphasis revolt, and was especially noteworthy following the reinstatement of the defeated King Porus as Satrap of India, as opposed to the highly anticipated appointment of a Greek administrator, which only served to ignite already existing sentiments of alienation, homesickness, disillusion, and skepticism, culminating in this mutiny.

   Now, regarding perhaps one of the most consequential figures during the Mutiny at Hyphasis was the General Coenus, who had been the first of the Macedonian high command to speak out in defense of and in favor of refusing to march any further – speaking on behalf of the Troops as transcribed in Arrian’s Anabasis. Coenus addressed numerous grievances, including the steep loss of life during recent battles, the increasingly uncertain prospects ahead, and more; however overwhelmingly his most prominent and asserted grievance was the widespread feeling of weariness and homesickness following a decade of unimpeded, uninterrupted conquest, while presenting alternatives to Alexander if he wished to pursue onwards, as an attempted means of compromising between the populace who wished a return home, and Alexander, who was still infatuated with his own visions’ of a future. However Coenus did attempt to provide warning to Alexander to no avail, his statement by the account of Arrian represented a great many Macedonians, and ignited a more free feeling of discontent that was expressed at Hyphasis and ultimately led to the end of Alexander’s campaign, not at the hands of the enemy, but at the whims of his own weary soldiers – and in my opinion, at the hands of Alexander’s great internal enemy within his own psyche. However this account, if you ask me, makes a fairly convincing argument for the veracity of homesickness as a cause of the mutiny at Hyphasis.

  Furthermore, another point of view regarding the mutiny at Hyphasis was addressed by Roy 2004, which acknowledged and emphasized utilizing primarily Indian historical texts and points of view, including transcribed histories from the reign of Chandragupta Maurya (who began to carve his empire in the Indian subcontinent shortly after Hyphasis), which acknowledged a sharp rise in Macedonian disillusion following the hard-fought Battle of Hydaspes in 326 BCE, alongside word of a vast Indian Army assembling of nearly a quarter million soldiers, the army had grown increasingly skeptical of Alexander’s leadership and administration as the weary Macedonian Army was set to face larger, native, well-acclimated, well-rested armies in a land that was largely foreign to them. Hence, the mutiny at Hyphasis had occurred following the increasing skepticism following the daunting opposing forces of the Indian Subcontinent dwarfing even the armies faced at Gaugamela.

   Now, returning to perhaps one of my favorite, most preeminent modern historians on the legacy of Alexander – Sir Robin Lane Fox – who asserted in chapter XX of his most recent expose on Alexander the Great; the Search for Alexander, entitled ‘Despair’ the multifaceted origins of the revolt, having to do with a great many issues, yet primarily a decline in the public confidence surrounding the leadership abilities of Alexander the Great. For this skepticism, only exacerbated following the battle of Hydaspes, had been emphasized by the high command and common infantry alike according to Fox, as demonstrated not only through the final writings of court historians but the notorious documents of pamphleteers who, especially in the years following Alexander’s death, demonstrated this sentiment in an attempt to besmirch the honor of various Diadochi by casting dispersions upon their name, in a society that had largely been reorganized in the image of Alexander.

   Lastly, with regards to the historical accounts Ptolemy I Soter, a childhood friend, wartime companion, strategic advisor, and prominent successor to Alexander, who would eventually become not only the ruler of Egypt and much of the Levant, but perhaps the most famous first-hand chronicler of the life and conquests of Alexander, which served not only to deify Alexander in popular memory (leading to the question of if Alexander would have even been as venerated in the present day, had his successors not established empires of their own utilizing Alexander for their own legitimacy and utilizing, even deifying his name for centuries in order to pay tribute and earn legitimacy, aggrandizing his deeds. Perhaps, if events had unfolded differently, he may have been viewed as another Philip depending on if the empire continued, or if the successors were not as successful, perhaps a Greek Sesostris, a more successful Alcibiades, or even a short-lived, lesser Cyrus, with all of the vigor, but none of the foresight), which have lived on throughout the millennia through accounts not only of the Ptolemaic Empire but the recollections of Arrian and various other erudite ancient scholars.

   However, within Ptolemies’ writing, he acknowledged that the mutiny at Hyphasis was caused due to primarily by a combination of homesickness amongst the masses, and an increasingly ill-intentioned skepticism of Alexander amongst his confidants, primarily Perdicass and Antigonus (both of which would later become major rivals of Ptolemy); while proclaiming himself as a pragmatic yet fiercely loyal follower of Alexander. However, although this is a fascinating rebuttal to alternative claims, it is worth noting that the accounts of Ptolemy held several inconsistencies when compared with other, non-Diadochi accounts, and although in my opinion an admirable, trustworthy man in his erudition and his cherishing of the arts (especially in his later life), it is worth noting that Ptolemy had a fair degree of political incentive and bias to paint himself in a better light as a loyal follower and even a reputed dynastic successor to Alexander while depicting his future geopolitical rivals as skeptics of the man all claimed their mandate to rule from, while conveniently glorifying Alexander as a; “Rational Expansionist”, with the best interests of the Greeks in his heart and mind.

    In conclusion, today we have been able to tangibly observe, understand, and attempt to internalize the events and preceding sentiments that respectively constituted and culminated in the 326 BCE Mutiny at the Hyphasis River. For, in analyzing historical events, however, especially the happenings of distant antiquity, it is near impossible to gauge the exact motives and rationale of every soldier, every commander, every general, and every citizen. However, as history has so often proven, these culminations of years, even decades are very rarely the product of a singular event – but rather the aggregate of a plethora of previous events. Likely, the reasons had a degree of variation depending on who you would ask, if you were to enter the proverbial courts of Ancient Men, to paraphrase Machiavelli. However, it can safely be said, not only based on the wide variation of sources and claims, but our contextual knowledge of both the extenuating circumstances at the time before the revolt, and our knowledge on the spirits of men, that it was not then, is not today, and frankly never will become the product of any one factor or solution. Rather, within life the real aim is not to pinpoint any one cause but to effectively balance and address the myriads of factors, dilemmas, and concerns that permeate any discussion.

   Thus, we can not only confidently assert and reaffirm the dichotomy of our own past and of the wider human condition, but also this moment that was perhaps the perfect storm, the perfect zenith of the centuries, in the form of not only Hyphasis for Alexander but the exploits of Alexander for the entire Ancient World. For these culminations of lifetimes worth of sentiments and buildup, can rather effectively exemplify a fundamental aphorism of life and history, that has been attributed to many men of many different backgrounds; St. Peter, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rumi, Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Mario Vargas Llosa, and even Steve Bannon weirdly enough, but is one that likely has persisted for millennia, and cannot safely be attributed to any one individual; “There are decades when nothing happens, and then there are weeks when Decades Happen”. A fundamental axiom of history, and the march of history altogether. For history is a march that has preceded us, and a march that shall long succeed all of us, yet a march that is defined by the way we chose to conduct ourselves, and to lead our everyday lives.